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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I investígate a question in the Rhetoric (and Topics) surrounding the 
metaphorical sense of Aristotle’s topos: one can look to a location for “available means of persuasion,” 
evoking an image of seeing (which connects with work on the spectacle in Greek philosophy); or topoi are 
viewed as “general lines of argument.” Are they places we go for arguments, or actual lines of arguments? 
The difference matters, given a propensity to view topoi as forerunners of argument schemes. 
 
KEY WORDS: Argumentation schemes, Aristotle, metaphor, Rhetoric, Topics, topoi. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The topos, as it appears in Aristotle’s works on argumentation (principally the Topics and 
the Rhetoric) is a notoriously obscure idea.1 Yet at the same time, it is clearly a central 
idea, one on which much of the accounts of dialectical and rhetorical reasoning depend. 
Kennedy (1991:45 ) infers from the absence of a definition that the meaning must have 
been obvious to Aristotle’s immediate audience (students, we must assume). But little of 
such obviousness permeates the principal treatments of the Topics and the Rhetoric. Nor 
is it even clear that these two works understand the topoi in the same way (Braet, 
2005:67): for one thing, the goals of the two works are quite different, with the Topics 
suggesting a handbook for procedures to succeed in dialectical exchanges or games 
(likely reflecting the activities of the Academy), and the Rhetoric proposing means for 
persuasion of an audience. 
 More recently, there has been a definite trend in the treatments of argumentation 
theorists to judge the topos as a forerunner of the argumentation scheme (Kienpointner, 
1986; Braet, 2005; Rubinnelli, 2006). This marks a shift from a range of treatments that 
wrestled with the metaphor of ‘place’ and what was suggested by it (Miller, 2000; Leff, 
1983; Kennedy; 1991). In this paper, I want to address this debate by reflecting again on 
the texts that gave rise to it. In particular, I want to pose and then answer in the 
affirmative the following question: is something lost if we cede the debate to the 
argumentation scheme side? 
 The current instantiation of the debate would seem to reflect an ongoing 
disagreement borne of distinct ways of translating ‘topos’. Topos literally means “place” 
and, given the generality which Aristotle often has in mind, is frequently translated as 
 
1 Kennedy (1991:45), Miller (2000:132), Braet (2005:66) and Rubinelli (2006:269) are some of the more 
recent treatments that concur in lamenting the absence of a definition. 
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“commonplace.” Such a metaphor refers to a location or space in art where a speaker can 
look for “available means of persuasion” (Kennedy, 1991). This evokes powerful visual 
imagery that is characteristic of Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric, while at the same 
time capturing the way we move from the private to the public, from an interior “seeing” 
to an exterior “speaking.” A speaker will often see the available means of persuasion. 
Kennedy, for example, translates “seeing” for theoresai, or theory. But, by contrast, we 
have Rhys Roberts’ well-known translation of topoi as “general lines of argument.” From 
this stems an understanding of topos as a proposition or even an argument. And Kennedy 
himself, in a note on the Rhetoric settles on “strategies of argument as discussed in 2.23” 
(1991:45). On this understanding, a topos is not so much the place we go as the actual 
procedure or strategy that we find and utilize.  
 In a preliminary way, we can note that each reading finds support in the 
Aristotelian texts. At the beginning of Book VIII of the Topics, the dialectician is 
entreated to choose the topos (place) from which he must make his attack, and is then told 
that such topoi have been delineated in the earlier books. Here the topoi appear as a 
ground or source for the argument. In Book I, chapter 2 of the Rhetoric a distinction is 
made between species and the topoi from which they are taken, where by species 
Aristotle means the premises specific to each genus and by topoi those premises common 
to all. Here, topoi appear as the familiar “lines of argument.” 
 
2. ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES 
 
As noted, it is this second reading that is finding popularity among argumentation 
theorists. In fact, Sara Rubinelli’s recent discussion of topi (and loci) explicitly leaves 
asides “occurrences where topos appears…with the meaning of ‘area’ or ‘position’,” 
(2006:254) to focus on those that support the argumentation-scheme reading. And she 
presents this in very modern terms: “Another sense of topos in ancient rhetoric is that of 
‘scheme of argument’. More specifically, a topos indicates a procedure for establishing or 
refuting propositions on which standpoints are adopted. In this perspective, a topos is 
essentially composed of a law, or general principle, with a probative function, and an 
instruction working as a searching formula” (255-56). 
 In many ways the work of scholars like Rubinelli and Braet, the latter of whom 
connects his thesis to the theories of van Eemeren & Grootendorst and Kienpointner, can 
be seen as attempts to flesh out what some other theorists have left indistinct. Van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992:98) speak of the “quintessence of the argumentation 
scheme” being expressed in the topos, and elsewhere (2004:5) refer to the argumentation 
scheme “resting” on the topos. Neither remark would commit them to the position that 
topoi are argumentation schemes. Garrsen (2001), who has done considerable work on 
argumentation schemes, takes the discussion a little further. He holds that the “classical 
concept of “topos” corresponds to the argument schemes in modern approaches to 
argumentation” (82). But while he seems to connect the sense of “location” evoked by the 
term “topos” to classical lists of different types of argument (Ibid.), he attributes no more 
to Aristotle himself than the issuing of general statements or rules that could be used in 
arguments. 
 Now, like all interpretations of topoi, this one has some ground of speculation to 
it. And like all interpretations, there is a case to be drawn from the text. The challenge is 
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always to tell a story that accommodates the range of suggestions at work in Aristotle’s 
writings. Rubinelli does as a good a job as anyone of making the case for the topos as a 
forerunner of the argumentation scheme. She builds an argument for seeing topoi as rules 
for inferential processes rather than simply the subject matters of arguments. Like Braet 
(2005; 2004) before her, she lays stress on the “if-then” clauses that Aristotle provides. 
Braet had proposed that the topical principles of the Rhetoric can be regarded “as the core 
of a modern argumentation scheme” (2005:66),2 and goes on to cite 2.23.25 and its topos 
“From cause and effect”: “if the cause exists, so does the effect; if it does not, there is no 
effect.” Braet could have chosen freely from a range of “if-then” clauses scattered 
throughout the common topoi of chapter 23. Examples: from opposites: “if the war is the 
cause of present evils, things should be set right by making peace” (2.23.1); from 
correlatives: “if something is honorably or justly predicated of one who experiences it, it 
is also of one who does it” (2.23.3); from the more and the less: “If not even the gods 
know everything, humans can hardly do so” (2.23.4); from “consequences by analogy”: 
“For example, when they tried to force his son who was underage to perform public 
services because he was tall, Iphicrates said that if they deem large boys men, they should 
vote that small men are boys” (2.23.17); and so on. It is a point of interest that in 
providing the principle from 2.23.25, Braet chooses to fill in the argument from the “if, 
then” clause. Thus, the principle “forms the if-then statement in the causal argumentation 
scheme ‘If the cause is present, the effect must occur; well then, the cause is present, 
therefore the effect will occur’” (2005:66). Aristotle, on the other hand, leaves this form 
implicit; his stress is on the simple strategy of connecting cause and effect. In separating 
the form and the scheme, Braet distinguishes the logical validity (form) from the 
persuasive power (scheme), thus seeing Aristotle as anticipating a modern distinction.3 
But given the implicit nature of this move, we might as well see the modern distinction as 
providing the grounds for an interesting interpretation of Aristotle.  
Rubinelli develops Braet’s proposal by drawing out at least three ways in which a 
topos is an argumentation scheme, according to the nature of the laws (Braet’s principles) 
found in the topoi (2006:256). So, a topos may be a scheme based on the nature of the 
logical predicates. This sense formed the core of the Topics, where Aristotle was 
“pioneering the field of informal logic” (Rubinelli, 2006:257) by distinguishing between 
definition, genus, property and accident. In each case, Aristotle provides a rule and 
instructions for how to apply the rule. So a rule (by definition) is that the definition must 
belong to all the sub-species of the subject, and the instruction is simply to compose an 
argument that verifies that a proposed definition belongs to the sub-species (258). A 
second way in which a topos can be a scheme of argument is distinguished from the first 
through an emphasis not on the logical nature of the predicates but comparisons between 
                                                 
2 Braet (2005:128) identifies Kienpointner (1992:115) as the sole scholar of argumentation schemes to 
“correctly” trace the concept to the notion of topos. Where he disagrees with Kienpointner is in insisting 
that there is an earlier tradition than the Aristotelian. 
3 Braet takes this much further (76-77), deriving a standpoint from the ‘then’ part of the clause (or 
principle), and an argument from the ‘if’ part, thus producing a “convincing enthymeme.” The principle is 
then an external rule from which the enthymeme draws its persuasive power. In this way, the principle acts 
like a logical inference rule. (Another reading then allows the principle to be seen as an internal rule.) It is 
then noted that the interpretation rendered is close to modern analyses of argumentation schemes, and an 
example is reconstructed accordingly. At each turn, Braet is careful to note the “plausible” or “conceivable” 
nature of the account which to Aristotle himself would seem anachronistic. 
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certain relationships. Thus, the “Iphicrates” example to which I drew attention above is of 
interest to Rubinelli not because of the “if, then” principle it uses, but the analogy 
between tall boys/men and short boys/men. Further cases are remarked on through 
Cicero’s use of analogy to extend legal cases in his Topics. Cicero, of course, does 
distinguish topoi that are the “peculiar province of the logicians” (XI:53), from earlier 
cases based on similarity or analogy, but he makes no explicit differentiation between 
types of topoi and since his audience is a jurist, all his examples are juridical ones. Still, 
Rubinelli derives some interesting points from what Aristotle can apparently do with this 
second kind of topos. 
As the third and final type that interests her, Rubinelli identifies topoi involving 
“a pattern which leads speakers to focus on interpersonal, emotional and linguistic 
aspects surrounding the production of arguments, including ways of tailoring certain 
contents according to the audience, the impact of the contents on the public and/or factors 
related to the psychology of the speakers and their interlocutors” (262). Factors relating 
to ethos and pathos, then, we might imagine, and expect the examples to derive from the 
Rhetoric, which they do.4 At Rhetoric, Bk II, 23:21, we find: “Another topos that is 
common to both litigants and deliberative speakers is to look at what turns the mind in 
favor and what turns the mind against something and for what reasons people both act 
and avoid action. For these are the factors that if present, impel action [but if not present, 
deter action]” (Kennedy translation). Following earlier suggestions from Braet, we might 
be inclined to interpret this in light of the “if, then” principle suggested, but Rubinelli is 
more concerned to draw our attention to the different kind of strategy involved. 
There is, then, much that is interesting in the argumentation-scheme approach to 
the topoi and the accounts provided are rich with detail (certainly much more than I have 
been able to show here). But they are all implicit accounts and the work involved is 
largely interpretive and aimed at showing what Aristotle must have understood by a topos 
from the various ways in which he used them. Largely suppressed here, though, is the 
alternative richness of the “place” metaphor, some sense of which no account of the topoi 
should avoid. 
 
3. METAPHORS OF PLACE 
 
 Miller (2000:136) notes that Aristotle’s original metaphor, used in both rhetoric 
and dialectic, conceived of topoi “not as propositions but as sources from which 
propositions (or terms, in dialectic) may be obtained.” But it is the nature of such 
“sources” that seems in dispute. Ultimately, she (Miller) will define a topos as a “point in 
semantic space that is particularly rich in connectivity to other significant or highly 
connected points” (142), which is suggestive, if a little vague. This way of reading topos 
is supported in part by Cicero’s understanding in his own treatment, not so much a 
commentary on Aristotle’s text (since he is working from memory) as his own 
presentation of the project:  
It is easy to find things that are hidden if the hiding place is pointed out and 
marked; similarly if we wish to track down some argument we ought to know the 
places or topics: for that is the name given by Aristotle to the “regions”, as it 
were, from which arguments are drawn. Accordingly, we may define a topic as 
                                                 
4 Along with further interesting examples from Cicero. 
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the region of an argument, and an argument as a course of reasoning which firmly 
establishes a matter about which there is some doubt (Topics, II:7). 
Still, there is a note of hesitancy in the “as it were,” and the idea of a region in which 
topics might “hide” is less than clear. Although at XIV:71, at the end of his presentation 
of “the rules of invention of arguments,” he remarks that after journeying through 
investigations of such matters as definition, genus, contradictions, causes, and so on, no 
region of arguments is left to explore. So this helps us understand the regions as different 
predicates (related to Rubinelli’s first type of topoi), at least in Cicero’s mind. 
 Missing from these remarks about place is any explicit reference to how we 
actually inhabit such places and how we might engage what we find there. George 
Kennedy, who has done extensive work on the Rhetoric, corrects this by reminding us of 
the “visual” nature of Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric. A speaker will often see the 
available means of persuasion, converting this literal insight (how ably our language 
assists us here to find back some of the obvious connections of which we have lost sight) 
into verbal communication. In fact, the Greeks in general were struck by the visual 
metaphors that connect the intelligible to the visible world. Think, for example, how for 
Plato the good illuminates within the mind in a way similar to the sun’s illumination of 
the physical world, so that the mind is able to see things and their connections; or the way 
Meno’s slave boy is brought by Socrates to move back and forth between the physical 
world and the intelligible world by means of a geometrical shape drawn on the ground to 
which the boy connects the parallel shape in his mind. Andrea Nightingale (2004) 
considers the role of the spectacle in Greek art and thought. Like the way we view the 
actors arranged on the theatre’s stage and standing in relation with each other, so we can 
grasp how ideas are arranged in the mind in similar relations. In fact, the key term here, 
theoria, relates to both, with its etymological connections to theatre and theory. 
Theoresai, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, translated by Kennedy as “seeing,” thus retains the 
way in which what is important is grasped first and foremost by the mind. 
 Given this, it is not surprising that Kennedy would raise questions about Roberts’ 
alternative translation of topos as “general lines of argument,” noting that the grounds for 
this are not obvious and deserve investigation (1996:173). In a similar way, he sees the 
visial emphasis at work in the Topics. In a discussion that echoes Cicero’s depiction of a 
journey, he speaks of Aristotle’s method in the Topics as “a road, and there are apparently 
“places” along the road where arguments can be found. Clearly,” Kennedy concludes, “he 
[Aristotle] thinks of arguments visually and assumes others will understand” (Ibid.). 
 What does it mean to think of “arguments visually”? The conversion of the visual 
into the verbal suggests something not just about the way arguers or speakers will view 
their material, but also the audiences with which they engage. This connects the topoi to 
the power and success of persuasion. Are we persuaded by the strength of a valid 
argument laid out before us (like Socrates’ diagram)? And if so, how does that work? If 
arguers have connected places to which they go for arguments, then audiences will have 
the same places where they can make connections. The conversion from visual to verbal 
must then be conducted back into the visual. Consigny (1974) and especially Burke 
(1950) take us a long way toward drawing the appropriate conclusions about this. 
 Among several interesting suggestions made by Consigny (1974) is that the topos 
must be a specific place where the rhetor thinks and acts. A topos has implications not 
only for the subject matter of an argument, but also for the rhetor and audience because it 
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is, after all, a rhetorical situation. Such an understanding might have been drawn from 
Kenneth Burke’s remarks on the topoi. Burke considers those of the Rhetoric to be 
primarily places of “opinion,” in the sense of the audience’s opinions with which an 
arguer or speaker needs to connect. Thus, Aristotle reviews the acts, conditions, personal 
characteristics, and so forth, that people have specific opinions about (considering some 
good, others evil, for example). All such opinions are presented as available means of 
persuasion. Burke also considers another type of topos “got by the manipulation of 
tactical procedures, by following certain rules of thumb for inventing, developing, or 
transforming an expression by pun-logic, even by specious and sophistical arguments” 
(1950:57). These are used as vehicles for the materials of opinion, but their status as topoi 
derives from their being distinguished by a formal or procedural element (thus linking 
them to the discussion of the previous section). 
 What is of greatest interest here, though, are Burke’s suggestions around the 
purpose of using such topoi. Essentially, they enhance collaboration in the argument on 
the part of the audience. An audience is moved not just by receiving an assertion, but by 
creatively participating in it. “Thus, you are drawn to the form, not in your capacity as a 
partisan, but because of some “universal” appeal in it. And this attitude of assent may 
then be transferred to the matter which happens to be associated with the form” (58). For 
example, gradation, where an argument builds to a conclusion, is a “strongly formal 
device.”5 By the time an audience reaches the second stage of the gradation, they will 
“feel” how it is to develop (we might better say here that they will “see” how it is to 
develop), and on the level of “purely formal assent” they will collaborate in fulfilling that 
form and completing the argument. And, we must add, they do this because the topoi are 
universals in the mind;6 they are not just places that arguers go, but to which audiences 
are led to complete reasoning. What seems tenuous in Burke’s proposal is the suggestion 
that the attitude of assent will be transferred to the issue that the form was carrying. The 
act of completing the argument oneself should contribute to the kind of self-persuasion 
characteristic of rhetorical argumentation; yet further aspects of persuasion may also be 
required. But for our purposes the point to be made lies in the availability of common 
“places” that both arguers and audiences can have recourse to in packing and unpacking 
argumentative discourse.  
 A strong candidate for that “internal place” where topoi reside would appear to be 
the memory. This at least is the plausible proposal of Robin Smith (1997) in a discussion 
that links the treatments of the Topoi and Rhetoric. “The topoi are thus systematically 
organized in a way that facilitates timely retrieval, a feature essential to any practical 
method for live debate: it is no use having a large stock of argument forms in memory 
unless one can also recall the right one at the right time” (xxvii). He refers to mnemonic 
systems at play during Aristotle’s time, which were based on the memorization of actual 
locations in a specific order: “items to be memorized were then superimposed on these 
images, making it possible to recall them in sequence” (Ibid.). In Bk VIII, 14, Aristotle 
                                                 
5 As Burke describes it, it seems comparable to the quasi-logical arguments presented by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969). 
6 In this paper, there is no space to explore the related problem of whether the topoi are to be read as 
general or specific. In both the Topics and the Rhetoric, the topoi seem to be given a primary sense as 
commonplaces. In the Rhetoric they are contrasted with idia, which are specific related to each subject. But 
topos is sometimes used to refer to idia (i.e. Bk I, 15), which creates an understandable confusion, see 
Grimaldi (1980/2006) 
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explains the need to learn arguments by heart for the most frequent problems we 
encounter (163b17). Next, one should be ready with definitions; then deal with problems 
under which other arguments fall. Here, we learn the starting points or basic premisses, 
not the arguments: 
For just as in geometry it is useful to have gone through exercises with the 
elements, or as in arithmetic having the multiplication table at your fingertips 
makes a great difference when figuring a multiple of some other number, so too in 
the case of arguments are having things at your fingertips when it comes to the 
starting-points and learning premises until they are on the tip of your tongue. For 
just as in the art of remembering, the mere mention of the places [topoi] instantly 
makes us recall the things, so these will make us more apt at reasonings through 
looking to these defined premisses in order of enumeration. And it is a common 
premiss rather than an argument which should be committed to memory (163b25-
33). 
There is a powerful immediacy being evoked here by Aristotle which may invite us to 
recall the transfer of assent to which Burke referred. The mere mention of topoi instantly 
makes us recall the things, and this process makes us better reasoners. Having memorized 
a repertoire of basic premises (not the large stock of argument forms that Smith referred 
to in his introduction), we are better able to construct our own arguments and refute those 
of our opponents (the goals of the Topics). 
 This, however, is the very point at which Rubinelli chooses to challenge the link 
of the rhetorical use of topos to ancient mnemonics. On her reading, two considerations 
would weaken the interpretation I have just given: First, the passage occurs in book VIII 
after the point at which Aristotle says he has finished with topoi. So here his concern is 
something else; the nature and use of propositions of which arguments are made, she 
suggests. Secondly, most of the topoi discussed in the Topics cannot be easily 
memorized. In each case there is a level of abstraction that makes it difficult to see how 
mnemonic exercises could help a speaker (2006:268-69).  
Neither point would seem decisive. It is the case that at both the end of book VII 
and the start of book VIII Aristotle indicates a shift in focus. It’s not so much that he has 
finished with topoi per se, but that he has finished enumerating them. That was the task 
of books II through VII, to set down the variety of sources or “attack-points” (as Smith’s 
translation provides). But he is still essentially dealing with topoi insofar as his interest 
shifts to how they should be arranged and, on our reading, learned. The large number of 
topoi provided here (and the Rhetoric will add to this number) present problems for the 
arguer who must somehow manage this repertoire. Using mnemonic devices, and 
particularly some based on physical locations, seems particularly apt and helpful. The 
common premises at 163b22-33 function as locations (topoi) under which the different 
arguments fall. Aristotle is here interested in how one remembers them (Cf. Smith 
commentary, p.159). On the second question, the level of abstraction involved depends to 
some degree on how exactly we are to understand topoi. The interpretations we receive 
from proponents of the argumentation-scheme approach like Braet and Rubinelli are 
indeed complex. But if, say, we focus on the principles or rules alone, the accounts would 
become less complex. Moreover, complexity itself may be seen as a reason for adopting 
some mnemonic device rather than against. The greater the difficulty the more the need. 
And we should not lose sight of the actual comparison which Aristotle is making in this 
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passage: “just as in geometry it is useful to have gone through exercises…or as in 
arithmetic…so too in the case of arguments.” While not admitting of the same level of 
abstractness, principles of geometry are nevertheless exactly that: abstract. The 
comparison is compelling. 
 The foregoing discussion, then, indicates something of what would be lost or 
overlooked if we fail to give sufficient regard to the metaphoric sense of topos. 
 
4. WHAT IS A TOPOS? 
 
Topoi do not give us arguments, complete or in outline. There may have been a tradition 
in the Academy, as Ryle suggests (1968), whereby students adopted standard lines of 
argument or specific positions on an issue. The various arguments against the Forms, 
detailed in Aristotle’s Metaphysics have an aura of such an origin. Students may have 
trotted out tried and tested arguments against each other in search of the refutation of an 
opponent, and always striving for that new line that would prove decisive. Indeed, as 
Miller (2000:137) notes, it is an advance of Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric that he 
could think beyond the mere discovery of Plato (for whom everything already is) to the 
invention of the new. But the Topics itself does not provide strong support for this 
Academy-tradition. Instead, we are given more general instructions for finding the 
materials with which to argue, concentrating on the variety of ways of dealing with the 
four predicates of property, definition, genus and accident. All arguments begin 
somewhere, not in the sense of a dispute or conflict that needs resolution, but the 
decisions regarding how to construct and present the argument. So all arguments will 
have their source in some topos. The argumentation of the Rhetoric, with the different 
goals informing that work, expands on the possible topoi to include ones that relate to the 
concerns of ethos and pathos. 
Three examples can assist us to review the range of possibilities and suggest 
further the nature of the topoi: 
(i)From the Topics (II:4): “there is the topos of substituting for a term one that is more 
familiar, for example, using ‘clear’ instead of ‘exact’ in speaking of a conception.” The 
reason Aristotle gives for employing such a topos is that when a term is more familiar, 
the thesis is more easily dealt with. The context of the Topics, unlike the Rhetoric, is the 
dialectical exercise of either constructing a thesis that an opponent then tries to refute, or 
destroying the thesis of an opponent. The topos of substituting terms is one that is 
common to both processes, says Aristotle, suggesting perhaps that not only is it 
prescriptively useful, but descriptively apparent in the exchanges that Aristotle has 
witnessed. As a topos, it is difficult to see it as more than a way to proceed, a route to an 
end, rather than a scheme to employ. There is no form to “fill in,” as we have seen in 
some earlier examples. In fact, and this is crucial, we could imagine several 
argumentation schemes being employed to convey the reasoning once this topos had been 
chosen. 
Also, with respect to this topos Aristotle makes the rare observation that topoi can 
be fallacious (ψευδής) if misapplied (a point relevant to the related debate over whether 
all fallacies must be arguments). So we might go to the wrong place, and part of the skill 
of using topoi is to match them to the appropriate context. 
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(ii) From the Rhetoric (Bk 2, 23:11-12): “Another [topos] is from a [previous] judgment 
about the same or a similar or opposite matter.” This topos has the title “from Authority,” 
but the kind of authority that seems intended here relates more to the ethos of the 
example. To illustrate the intent, Aristotle refers to Aristippus replying to a dogmatic 
Plato that “our companion [Socrates] would have said nothing of the sort.” Again, as a 
general rule or principle the advice seems to evoke the name of an exemplar familiar to 
the audience and with whom the audience would feel some association. We could 
extrapolate from the principle (and the case mentioned) that therefore, Plato should say 
nothing of the sort because Socrates is the kind of authority who Plato would wish to 
emulate. One can appreciate from this how a topos could be seen to act like a Toulminian 
warrant (Bird, 1961), linking a premise with a claim. But it does this only if we use it that 
way, that is, make the extrapolation. All the text requires is that the reader find this tact 
useful in appropriate situations. 
(iii) A third example comes not from Aristotle but Cicero’s Topics (II :10), and illustrates 
how topoi quickly came to be interpreted: “Sometimes there is an enumeration of parts, 
and this is handled in the following manner: So-and-So is not a free man unless he has 
been set free by entry in the census roll, or by touching with a rod, or by will. None of 
these conditions has been fulfilled, therefore he is not free.” Here, the topos is drawn out 
to show how the argument itself can run. This is the kind of extrapolation now favored by 
many theorists. But the topos itself is the rule, or principle, or “point” (to retain a spatial 
metaphor), the application of which Cicero then demonstrates. Cicero, too, lamented 
Aristotle’s failure to define this central idea, but he was prepared to define it 
(hesitatingly, as we saw earlier) as a “region” from which arguments are drawn. In fact, 
each of the three examples I have cited is remarkable for its non-schematic-like 
appearance. Rather, substitution, example, and enumeration are visually compelling as 
images. We can see what Aristotle (and then Cicero) had in mind in proposing them. We 
can see this because we are an audience that can locate in our own minds the points being 
identified. 
 Barbara Warnick (2000), in her comparison of the topical systems of Aristotle and 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca , observes of the spatial metaphor that few scholars 
speculate where the “places” might be, and when they do, they opt for the mind (107). 
There seems little alternative, unless we are to imagine some handbook of topoi which 
arguers should carry about with them and consult during argumentative exchanges. But 
Warnick also follows Leff (1983:25) in insisting that for rhetorical argumentation the 
topoi must be relative to an audience and thus the arguer is required to know the “values, 
presumptions, predispositions, and expectations of the audience” (2000:108). We can 
agree with this without conceding that these themselves must be topoi or features of 
topoi. But they are considerations that would come into play when choosing topoi.7 The 
kind of collaboration between arguer and audience, suggested by Burke, and valued in 
rhetorical argumentation, would require as much. The arguer needs not just to know her 
own mind, and the topoi resident there; but also the mind of her audience and what topoi 
they are likely to recognize and, hence, to be persuaded by the arguments drawn from 
them. The cognitive environment shared by arguer and audience (and another kind of 
space!) will be crucial here. Being in a “space,” albeit a mental one, not only locates a 
                                                 
7 Just as we might expect the dialectical player of the Topics to gauge his opponent and decide which topoi 
to select accordingly. 
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topos (and renders it locatable), it also relates it to other ideas. Such ideas are the 
cognitive furniture of our mental lives; preconditions for effective argumentation and 
communication. Thus, knowing one’s audience involves not just their beliefs, values, and 
so on, but what kinds of topoi they will recognize and be able to locate in their own 
mental space. There is value to remembering this, value carried through the metaphor of 
place essentially attached to the concept of a topos; a value threatened if we think only of 
topoi as argumentation schemes. 
 
link to commentary 
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